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INTRODUCTION
Reform that followed in the wake of corporate scandals 
at Enron
and WorldCom, the most dramatic changes in corporate 
governance
in seventy years, arrived from a surprising direction. 
State law, the
primary source of governance rules, stood pat, content 
to continue as
before with a set of rules that trust directors 
and private ordering.
Federal law, long distrustful of that approach 
but still unwilling to
directly displace state incorporation rules, nibbled 
around the edges
of governance by expanding the obligations of officers 
and prescrib-
ing increased roles for various gatekeepers of corporate 
practice. The
most dramatic governance changes, instead, showed 
up in the listing
standards of our national stock exchanges. Their 
detailed require-
ments for independent directors and their role in 
the corporation go
to the heart of corporate governance.
Corporate governance from listing standards is 
not new; its roots
are deep in the nineteenth century, when the 
exchanges were com-
pletely private bodies. But the recent use of these 
standards reflects a
different use and a different motivation. The stock 
exchange denomi-
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nated rules have become the means by which a federal agency, here
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), can avoid the feder-
alism-based limits on its authority imposed by the federal courts in
cases such as Business Roundtable v. SEC.' The effectiveness of these
stock exchange governance rules against legal challenge stands in
contrast to the agency's more recent rulemaking as to mutual funds
and hedge funds, which has been struck down by federal courts.2 At
the same time, technology and institutional changes in equity markets
have dramatically modified the economic incentives of the exchanges
to make and enforce governance listing standards. The result is an
unstable equilibrium for corporate governance rules arising from this
source.
This Article begins in Part I with a brief introduction of the trium-
virate of lawgivers that shapes American corporate governance, focus-
ing particularly on the current location of the line between federal
and state law in this sharing of power. Part II traces the evolution of
the stock exchange listing standard, a history that focuses on the dom-
inant American exchange, the New York Stock Exchange. Part III
models the lawgiving function of the exchange, probing the lessening
economic incentives for an exchange to provide such rules, and
changes brought about by the New York Stock Exchange going public
in 2006. In the wake of these changes this Article suggests that listing
standards have taken on a larger role as a means for the SEC to avoid
judicially imposed limits on rulemaking. Part IV explores the SEC's
ability to use such exchange rulemaking to move the line of substan-
tive corporate regulation between the federal and state realms and
concludes with a peek into what we might expect in the future as to
corporate governance rules from stock exchanges.
I. THE TRIUMVIRATE OF LAWGIVERS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
This examination begins with the three major sources of formal
rules provided for corporate governance: state law, federal law, and
1 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
2 Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding
that the agency failed to determine costs of requirements of independent chair of
mutual fund and seventy-five percent independent directors and failed to address a
proposed alternative). In a petition brought by the Chamber of Commerce in a fol-
low-up case, the court found it inappropriate for the agency, in response to the first
case, to rely on material not in the rulemaking record without affording any opportu-
nity for public comment. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 901 (D.C. Cir.
2006); see also Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 883-84 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (invalidating
an SEC rule requiring hedge fund registration based on the court's conclusion that
the rule conflicted with the purposes of the Investment Advisor Act of 1940).
1146 NOTRIF DAME LAW--VIEW
the listing standards of the stock exchange where a company's shares
are traded. There are other sources that are important 
to govern-
ance, but they trail the impact of the first three and are 
put aside for
the current discussion. These include, for example, 
the individual
firm's articles of incorporation, its bylaws, and various 
contractual
obligations that provide incentives or monitors for corporate 
govern-
ance.3 In addition, the various markets in which 
the corporation
operates can be important constraints on governance.
4 Norms, both
of the individual directors and those that shape the 
business world,
often act as substitutes for law.
5
A. State Law: The Traditional Locus of Corporate Governance Law
State law has traditionally occupied center stage 
among laws
structuring corporate governance. It is state law 
that creates corpora-
tions and decrees the rights of the three key players 
in governance:
shareholders, directors, and officers.
6 In turn, the dominant state law
approach has been defined by Delaware, that small 
mid-Atlantic state
that has acquired a preeminent position in American 
corporate law as
the home to more corporations than the other 
forty-nine states
combined and holding an eighty-five percent market 
share among
corporations that choose to incorporate outside 
of their headquar-
ters' state.7 Delaware's approach to corporate governance 
has been
clear for decades: trust directors and leave them ample 
space within
which to make decisions about how to govern the 
corporation.8 Thus,
3 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: 
"It's About the Gatekeepers, Stu-
pid". 57 Bus. LAw. 1403, 1416-17 (2002).
4 These include the company product market, 
the market for capital, the market
for executives and other employees, and the market 
for corporate control.
5 See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands 
of Conscious Power: Laz,
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 
1653-63 (2001) (dis-
cussing norms as nonlegally enforceable rules and 
standards). Corporate governance
policies requiring resignation of directors who do 
not get fifty percent of votes cast for
their election are a recent example of norms. 
See Thaddeus C. Kopinski, Majority
Election Backers Hail Pfizer's Move, FRIDAY REP.,July 1, 2005, http://www.issueatlas.com/
content/subscription/fridayreportfiles/fridayreport07012005.html.
6 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) ("[Tlhe first place 
one must look to
determine the powers of corporate directors is 
in the relevant State's corporation
law."); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) ("Corporations are creatures 
of state law,
and investors commit their funds to corporate directors 
on the understanding that...
state law will govern the internal affairs of the 
corporation.").
7 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' 
Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46
J.L. & ECON. 383, 391 tbl.2 (2003).
8 See generally Robert B. Thompson, Delaware, 
the Feds, and the Stock Exchange:
Challenges to the First State as First in Corporate Law, 
29 DEL. J. CoRn. L. 779, 780-83
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Delaware begins with placing all corporate power 
in the directors and
provides expansive deference (via the business judgment rule 
and
other doctrines) to their decisionmaking regarding 
the corporation.9
The implicit message of the Delaware system is not 
to reject the vari-
ous constraints on corporate governance described 
in the introduc-
tion to this Part, but to funnel all of them 
through the board of
directors and to leave the board relatively 
unfettered in making
choices as it sees fit.
B. Federal Law: No Longer Happy with a Supporting 
Role?
Throughout the twentieth century, Congress chose 
not to enact a
federal incorporation law that would displace state 
law rules of corpo-
rative governance. But, from time to time, 
usually when moved by
corporate scandals, Congress has chosen to focus 
on particular aspects
of corporate governance that seemed to be broken. 
Thus, the federal
lawmakers have chosen to federalize part of the 
shareholder-director
relationship, the officer-shareholder relationship, 
and particularly in
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbox"), the officer-director 
rela-
tionship. t0 Specific examples of federal intrusion 
include:
" Insider trading;
15
" Solicitation of proxies;'
2
" Tender offers and going private transactions.11
The chosen method of federal regulation usually 
has been disclo-
sure. As such, federal law has long acknowledged 
its supplemental
role to the states in allocating substantive rights 
allocated among
directors and shareholders. Other constituencies 
have been diverted
(2004) (suggesting what would be Delaware's mission statement 
as a corporate law
provider).
9 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (a) (2001) (providing that all corporate 
power is by
or under the direction of directors).
10 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 
116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); see infra Part 
1I.
11 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS 
OF SECURITIES REGULATION
936-39 (5th ed. 2004) (noting that thanks to Rule lOb-5, 
the minority rule under
state common law as to insider trading has become 
the law of the land).
12 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a)-(g) (2000).
13 See 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams) 
("The need for such
legislation has been caused by the increased use of 
cash tender offers rather than the
regular proxy fight to gain control of publicly owned 
corporations.... This legislation
will close a significant gap in investor protection 
under the Federal securities
laws .... ."); see also S. REP. No. 90-550, at 4 (1967) (explaining 
that the proposed bill
would "provide for full disclosure in connection 
with cash tender offers and other
techniques for accumulating large blocks of 
equity securities of publicly held
companies").
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to other statutes, leaving corporate law focused on directors, share-
holders, and officers. 14
Traditional notions of federalism framed judicial responses when
federal courts or the SEC sought to widen the reach of federal law. In
the 1960s and 1970s, a series of lower federal court decisions
expanded the reach of the antifraud provision of the federal securities
law to take in much of corporate mismanagement.'" In Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green,' 6 the Supreme Court brought a halt to such
judicial redefining of the allocation between federal and state law. 7 It
held that shareholder complaints about majority shareholders push-
ing through a merger on allegedly unfair terms should be left to state
law:
Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to
federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that
deals with transactions in securities, particularly where established
state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden. As the
Court stated in Cort v. Ash, ... "Corporations are creatures of state
law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the
understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires cer-
tain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state
law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation." 18
Since Santa Fe, the context generating the principal discussion of
corporate law federalism has moved from the litigation setting, which
generated the earlier cases, to rulemaking by the SEC.' 9 Also since
that time, the Supreme Court has developed the Chevron doctrine as
to administrative deference to an agency's actions.20 The framework
for judicial discussion of the federalism aspects of SEC action at the
14 MarkJ. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2491, 2499-2504 (2005).
15 See, e.g., Green v. Santa Fe Indus. Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1299 (2d Cir. 1976)
(holding that fraudulent undervaluing of shares in a merger can constitute 10b-5
fraud), rev'd 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 221 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc) (holding that majority self-dealing, without more, can constitute
10b-5 violation).
16 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
17 Id. at 478-80.
18 Id. at 479 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)).
19 An exception involving neither judicial common law nor rulemaking is the
case law around the-question of whether the United States Constitution preempts
state legislation raising defensive tactics against takeovers. Compare Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982) (holding unconstitutional an Illinois anti-takeover act
as indirect violation of the Commerce Clause), with CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
Am., 481 U.S. 69, 86-87, 94 (1987) (sustaining Indiana anti-takeover law against pre-
emption and Commerce Clause challenges).
20 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984).
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boundary between federal and state authority is 
most clearly set out in
the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Business Roundtable,
21 relating to an SEC
rule that, in effect, banned midstream adoption of 
dual class voting in
corporations, albeit through a requirement that 
stock exchanges
impose such a limit.
2 2 Dual class voting is a corporate governance
structure that gives one set of shareholders (usually managers 
or the
founders) a class of votes with multiple votes per share, 
thereby
permitting them to maintain control of the 
enterprise even though
having only a minority of the equity interest.
2 3 Such voting rules are
at the core of the state law of corporations. 
The federal appellate
court threw out the federal prohibition of 
this voting arrangement
based on federalism concerns and citing 
Santa Fe.2 4 The opinion con-
cluded with a strong rebuke of the SEC's efforts: 
"To argue that Con-
gress's 'equal regulation' mandate supports 
SEC control over
corporate governance through national listing 
standards is to gamble
that the court will accept a Commission spin 
on a statutory fragment
without even a glance at its context. 
Wrong court, bad gamble."2
Congressional action in passing Sarbox can provide 
the kind of
clear indication of congressional intention sought 
by the Court in the
Santa Fe and Business Roundtable cases. There the 
federal government
imposed new regulations on: (1) accountants/auditors;
26 (2) attor-
neys; 27 and (3) analysts. 28 These rules do not directly impinge 
on Dela-
ware corporate law. These gatekeepers certainly 
impact governance,
but their regulated activities are not central to 
the model that Dela-
ware follows. Some parts of the federal law do 
define the roles of
directors and officers beyond what federal law 
had done previously.
As to directors, it specified the function of the audit 
committee of the
board,29 required that all members of that committee 
be indepen-
21 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
22 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (2006).
23 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The 
Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule
19c-4, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 568-74 (1991) (tracing the 
history of the rule's develop-
ment and litigation).
24 Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 410.
25 Id. at 416.
26 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-204, §§ 103-303, 116 Stat. 745,
750-78 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
27 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. IV 2004). This led to an 
SEC regulation titled "Stan-
dards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys 
Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer." 
17 C.F.R. § 205 (2006).
28 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 501. This led to regulation 
promulgated by the
SEC. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.500-.505 (2006).
29 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (m) (2 ).
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dent,3 0 and effectively required that at least one member be finan-
cially literate. 3' Those rules are not inconsistent with Delaware law,
but Delaware law does not even require an audit committee, nor does
it have any qualifications for directors (other than that they be natural
persons).32 What the federal law has done, for the first time, is take
away the right of Delaware to leave this space vacant and to let private
ordering determine the appropriate means by which directors do
their jobs.
In addition Congress has imposed several very specific obligations
on officers: (1) requiring the CEO and CFO to certify financial state-
ments; 3 3 (2) requiring the corporation's attorneys to report to the
chief legal officer or the chief executive officer about breaches of fidu-
ciary duty;34 (3) requiring the CEO to certify whether controls in
place are effective;3 5 and (4) requiring a code of conduct or an expla-
nation why the company lacks one.3 6 Again, these requirements are
not in conflict with any affirmative requirement of Delaware law.
Indeed Delaware law is almost completely silent about officers and
says nothing about what they must do. Section 142 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law refers to officers, but the section defers
almost completely to the corporation's bylaws or board resolutions as
to what officers should do, how they are chosen, and how vacancies
30 See id. § 78j-1 (in) (3) (requiring that each member of the audit committee be
independent). Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, amended § 10A of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301.
31 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (requiring the SEC to issue rules mandating that issuers "dis-
close whether or not, and if not, the reasons therefor, the audit committee . .. is
comprised of at least 1 member who is a financial expert, as such term is defined by
the Commission"); see Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees,
Exchange Act Release No. 33-8220, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003). The release
adds Item 401(h) to Regulation S-K. Id. at 18,817-18. It also adds Item 7(d)(3) to
Schedule 14A. Id. at 18,807-08.
32 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (Supp. 2002 & 2006) (requiring that each
member of the board of directors be a natural person, but not specifying other direc-
tors' qualifications or requiring that board members be shareholders); id. § 141(c)
(2001) (permitting the board to designate one or more committees, but not requir-
ing any).
33 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7261 (West Supp. 2006). This followed SEC action pursuant
to its investigatory powers that required top officers of almost one thousand compa-
nies to certify their financial results. See File No. 4-460: Order Requiring the Filing of
Sworn Statements Pursuant to Section 21(a) (1) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/4-460.htm (last visited Jan. 26,
2007).
34 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West Supp. 2006).
35 See id. § 7262.
36 See id. § 7264.
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are filled.3 7 This new federal law now constricts 
the space that Dela-
ware has given directors to define or not define 
what the directors
want the officers to do.
C. The Third Side of the Triangle: Stock Exchange Listing Standards
In addition to state and federal law, American 
corporate govern-
ance rules derive from the listing standards 
of the stock exchanges.
Exchanges specify particular internal governance 
rules that apply to a
company that chooses to have its stock listed 
on that exchange.
Although a recent New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) release touted
the Exchange as the nation's "principal source 
of corporate govern-
ance standards,""" the impact of the exchange 
prior to Enron had
shrunk to a fairly minor level.
3 9 In the aftermath of Enron and
WorldCom, however, changes to the listing standards 
have brought
the exchanges back into the board room in terms 
of specifications for
director behavior and corporate governance.
40
The evidence discussed below suggests that the 
stock exchange
rules as to corporate governance usually occupy 
a space between what
is currently required by state corporate law and 
what is currently
required by federal securities and can be a 
means to change the
boundary between them. The new requirements 
for independent
directors found in stock exchange listing requirements 
were pro-
voked, nurtured, massaged, modified, and approved 
by the agency.
As this is currently unfolding, this process is more 
one of disguised
federalization with the SEC using stock exchange 
regulations to
address areas that have not clearly been within 
the federal space, but
which the federal agency does not want to leave 
to the results cur-
rently provided by state law. Thus stock exchange 
governance regula-
tions have a federalism aspect more than some 
other examples of
rulemaking at the intersection of government 
and private organiza-
tion and are more of a branch of federal regulation 
than their form
might suggest.
41
37 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142 (2001).
38 NYSE, GOvERNANCE OF THE NEW YORK STOCK 
EXCHANGE, INC. 1 (2003), availa-
ble at http://nyse.com/pdfs/govemancewhitepaper-pdf.
39 For greater detail on this point, see infra Part II.
40 See infra Part II.C.3.d.
41 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Revisiting the One 
Share/One Vote Controversy: The
Exchanges' Uniforn Voting Rights Policy, 22 SEC. REG. L.J. 175, 176 
(1994) (arguing that
the SEC "has misused its informal power to regulate 
exchange listing standards ...
As such, the present proposal may be viewed as 
a lawless power grab by the SEC.").
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11. SOURCES OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE'S
ROLE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. Overview
The 2002-2003 revisions to the stock exchange listing standards,
which require a majority of independent directors for listed compa-
nies and key committees made up entirely of independent directors,
are the latest illustration of corporate governance from exchanges in a
line that stretches back to 1869.42 Early exchange rules as to govern-
ance came from the NYSE. The American Stock Exchange eagerly
sought to provide a market for those shares not traded in New York,
but saw little need to provide governance listing requirements as a
means to do that until the 1960s.43 In the last two decades, Nasdaq
has competed directly with the NYSE for company listings, but govern-
ance listing requirements have not been the usual basis for that com-
petition. 44 The growing ease by which investment funds can move
across national borders has broadened the scope of the relevant mar-
ket for stock exchanges in recent years. At least until the collapse of
the bubble economy, foreign listings had been the major source of
growth for the NYSE in the 1990s. Any discussion of listing require-
ments must necessarily include the possibility of competition from
exchanges in other countries. 45
42 To view the New York Stock Exchange's proposed changes to its listing require-
ments mandating greater independence for directors, see NYSE, CORPORATE GoVRN-
ANCE RULE PROPOSALS (2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp_govpro-
b.pdf. Nasdaq proposed revisions to its listing requirements requiring boards to have
a majority of independent directors and for directors to meet without company man-
agement. See NAT'L Ass'N OF SEcuRITIEs DEALERS, INC., FORM 19b-4 PROPOSED RuLE
CHANGE (2002), available at http://www.nasdaqcom/about/SR-NASD-2002-141 NAS-
DAQ.RuleFiling.pdf. They became effective after approval by the SEC in Novem-
ber, 2003.
43 GEORGE L. LEFFLER, THE STOCK MARKET 203 (3d ed. rev. Loring C. Farwll
1963).
44 Until 2006, Nasdaq was not an exchange under the Securities Exchange Act, a
regulatory difference not directly relevant to the promulgation of listing standards.
For purposes of this Article, Nasdaq is treated as an exchange for the entire period of
the independent governance listing standards. See generally Regulation of Exchanges
and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 40,760, 63 Fed. Reg.
70,844, 70,852 (Dec. 22, 1998) (excluding from the interpretation of "exchange" cer-
tain "activities that could be considered traditional brokerage activities").
45 See, e.g., Toshio Aritake, Tokyo Stock Exchange Unveils Corporate Governance Guide-
lines, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 523, 523 (Mar. 22, 2004) (providing voluntary
guidelines but not requiring examination as a factor in listing requirements);
Jonathan Hopfner, Singapore Exchange Revamps Listing Rules to Raise Corporate Govern-
[VOL. 82:31152
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The stock exchanges began as private entities, establishing and
enforcing rules for the behavior of their members, but legislative
changes in the twentieth century gave them a public dimension as
well. The Securities Exchange Act of 193445 required all exchanges to
register with the federal government and regulated various aspects of
behavior occurring on the exchange (although originally not
extending to listing standards). Specific sections of the 1934 Act cov-
ered behavior such as the margin requirement for trading and insider
trading.47 Another section of the Act authorized the SEC to make a
study of rules of the exchanges, including their governance and disci-
pline.4 In 1937 SEC Chairman William 0. Douglas threatened to
enact new trading rules as a way to spur reorganization of the NYSE's
governance. 49 Exchange discipline of the trading conduct of its
members is overseen by the SEC in a shared public-private function
that grew out of similar efforts elsewhere in government during the
New Deal and continued to evolve after the Supreme Court's limiting
of such partnerships in it's A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States ° decision in 1935.
Statutory changes in 1975 expanded the reach of the federal
government over trading markets in a way that reached listing stan-
dards. 5' The legislation vested the SEC with new and broad authority
to regulate the trading markets as part of a mandate to develop a
national market system.5 2 This included new powers over the stock
exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
(the creator and then owner of the Nasdaq market) which provided
ance Standards, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1066, 1066 (June 19, 2006) (requiring at
least two independent directors who are Singapore residents).
46 Pub. L. No. 78-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
47 Id. § 7.
48 Id. § 19(c).
49 See SEC Historical Soc'y, The Chairmanship of William 0. Douglas and the Battle on
Wall Street, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleies/douglas/chairmanship
.php (last visited Jan. 26, 2007); see also Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder
Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 687,
688-90 (1986) (describing the history of the NYSE rules).
50 295 U.S. 495, 528-29 (1935) (holding unconstitutional the National Industrial
Recovery Act of 1933 as exceeding the federal government's power under the inter-
state Commerce Clause and as an invalid delegation of legislative power).
51 See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 3, 89 Stat. 97, 100
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(27)-(28) (2000)) (amending Section 3 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 and broadening SEC power to revise and amend SRO
rules).
52 Id. § llA (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and charging the
SEC to develop a national securities system, including powers to designate securities
eligible for trading in national markets).
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the means by which parallel regulation could be achieved over the
Nasdaq stock market. The SEC received the power to approve, disap-
prove, abrogate, add to, or delete from, rules adopted by the
exchanges.53 It was pursuant to Section 19(c) that the SEC in the late
1980s promulgated the one share/one vote rules discussed below, and
it was Rule 19c-4 that led to the opinion of the D.C. Circuit in the
Business Roundtable decision that struck down the rule as beyond the
SEC's authority. 54
B. Governance Listing Standards: A Relatively Small Part of
the Economic Function of a Stock Exchange
Setting governance requirements for listed companies is a small
part of what U.S. stock exchanges do, and this activity plays second
fiddle to their other core functions. The regulation of the trading
process, particularly as it relates to the brokers and other
intermediaries who trade, remains the most important economic
function of an exchange. Rules relating to obligations to settle con-
tracts and to the obligation of specialists to make a market illustrate
stock exchange rules of this type. 55 Second, stock exchanges tradi-
tionally developed a disciplinary system relating to broker-dealers and
other participants in the exchange process who deal with end-point
buyers and sellers. 56 Internal governance requirements for compa-
nies whose shares are listed on the exchange are more removed from
the core economic functions of an exchange.
The traditional organizational structure of the NYSE reflected its
diverse panoply of functions relating to the interactions of the mem-
bers who trade on the exchange and the larger investment commu-
nity. Until 2006, the NYSE had been a mutual, member-owned, not-
53 Id. §§ 19(b)-(c). The SEC's power under Section 19(b) is different from its
power under Section 19(c). Section 19(b) requires an SRO to file proposed rule
changes with the SEC, which must approve or reject them based on whether they are
consistent with the requirements of the Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(b) (1), 78s(b) (3) (C)
(2000). The Court in Business Roundtable listed a host of such SRO rules that relate to
matters traditionally regulated by state law. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d
406, 409 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (observing that no party expressed doubt as to the
SEC's jurisdiction as to those actions). In contrast, Section 19(c) permits the SEC to
affirmatively impose SRO rules if they are "necessary or appropriate" to further the
purposes of the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2000).
54 Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 417.
55 See, e.g., NYSE Rule 492 (member's obligation to provide best execution for a
customer's order).
56 See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
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for-profit corporation.
5 7 This juxtaposition of a nonprofit label with
what is frequently portrayed as the heart 
of the American capitalistic
system may seem a littlejarring. It does not mean that 
members were
not about seeking to make a profit. They 
were. And they expected
the exchange to be very profitable to them 
in that process. Members'
seats, which provided the right to buy and 
sell on the exchange, could
themselves be sold for prices that routinely 
were in the seven figures, a
price that reflects the economic value 
that members see in being able
to trade on the exchange.
58 The exchange's nonprofit status meant
that the exchange could not pay dividends, 
a constraint that both
affected its needs for income and dampened 
concerns of groups of
members that they could be taken advantage 
of by other groups of
members seeking to take money 
out of the exchange.
59
Members traditionally had the right to 
elect the board of direc-
tors of the NYSE, although pursuant 
to a series of changes in the
NYSE articles of incorporation, their influence 
became more and
more indirect. Prior to 2003, half of the 
board members could come
from the securities industry participants 
who typically owned the seats
on the exchange.60 The others, although voted 
on by the members,
were designated as public members who 
often reflected the interest of
listed companies and the investing public.
6
' As in public corpora-
tions, the nominating committee is crucial 
to selection of membership
to the board. Membership influence here 
did not appear to be very
great; that of the CEO, such as Richard 
Grasso, appeared to be
stronger.6 2 Changes made to the governance 
of the NYSE after the
departure of CEO Richard Grasso in 2003 
following a controversy
57 See Aaron Lucchetti, Big Board Will Ring Its 
Own Bell, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2006,
at C1.
58 See Press Release, NYSE, New York Stock 
Exchange Ends Member Seat Sale
Today (Dec. 30, 2005), available at http://www.nyse.com/press/113585642
0 8 2 4 htm
(providing, in graphical form, the price of seats over 
the last century).
59 See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 515 (McKinney 2005) 
(stating that a not-
for-profit corporation "shall not pay dividends 
or distribute any part of its income or
profit to its members, directors, or officers").
60 See NYSE, supra note 38, at 3 & n.9 (describing 
the pre-20 0 3 governance).
61 See New York Stock Exchange, Certificate 
of Incorporation, art. IV (1978) (on
file with the author). The board also included the Chairman, 
Executive Vice-Chairs
and President of the Exchange.
62 Se COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, 
PRIVATE ENTITY WITH A PUBLIC 
PUR-
POSE 18 (2003), available at hciiorg/dcwascii/web.nsf/files/4FBOE3
F1C5AII8F187256E 19 00 580 8Cg/$file/NYSE%20Monograph.pdf 
("'Much of the
concern about Grasso's pay is that it is set by a 
committee of people he regulates."'
(quoting Jenny Anderson, NYSE Board Wants Grasso's Green Made Public, 
N.Y. POST,
June 2, 2003, at 29)).
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over his compensation further weakened the direct power of the
members to shape the board.63 A majority of board members then
had to be independent of industry, and the disciplinary functions of
the exchange were moved into a separate corporate division, follow-
ing a pattern set by the Nasdaq/NASD boards in the 1990s. 6 4 The
NYSE's merger with Archipelago, approved by shareholders in
December 2005, provides a new publicly owned parent entity that will
change the exchange's economic incentives to provide both regula-
tion and listing standards, as discussed in more detail below.65
NYSE governance has traditionally been somewhat opaque, with
power shared among a richly layered committee structure. As revealed
on the NYSE website, it has a multitude of standing committees and
advisory committees to undertake its various tasks. 66 This structure
may have originally reflected the heterogeneous interests of various
participating groups on the exchange-specialists, floor brokers, and
upstairs brokers, for example-so that one group could not oppor-
tunistically take advantage of another. 67 In recent decades, this broad
structure permitted the exchange to give a greater governance role to
stakeholders other than its members, particularly the interests of
listed companies and public investors.
The exchange's board of directors adopts listing standards with-
out any direct involvement of the members or shareholders. The
committee structure means that these rules are subject to comments
from various quarters, but it is not yet clear how this function fits
within the other functions of the exchange, the regulatory separation
63 Kip Betz, NYSE Membership Approves Sweeping Changes, Slate of New Directors, 35
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1965, 1965-66 (Nov. 24, 2003) (naming a fully indepen-
dent board of directors and a twenty-member board of executives to function as an
intermediary between the independent directors and the exchange's listed compa-
nies, member-owners, and floor constituents).
64 NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, INC., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE
NASD SELECT COMMITTEE ON STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE TO THE NASD BOARD OF
GovERNoRS, at app. A (1995) (usually referred to, as it will be here, as the Rudman
report, after its chairman, former Senator Warren Rudman). The Committee was
appointed by the NASD Board of Governors in November 1994 in the wake of the
odd-eighths scandal.
65 Kip Betz, Big Board, Archipelago Members Approve Merger to Form for-Profit NYSE
Group Inc., 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2026, 2026 (Dec. 12, 2005).
66 See, e.g., NYSE, NYSE Group Committees, http://www.nyse.com/corpgovern-
ance/139013920553.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007) (describing a host of advisory
committees including an Exchange Traders Advisory Committee, Individual Investors
Advisory Committee, Institutional Traders Advisory Committee, Upstairs Traders
Advisory Committee, and an International Advisory Committee).
67 Craig Pirrong, A Theory of Financial Exchange Organization, 43 J.L. & ECON. 437,
464 (2000).
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envisioned by the 2003 reorganization, and the 2006 changes in own-
ership structure.
C. The Evolution of Listing Standards
The New York Stock Exchange grew from origins said to be
under a buttonwood tree in the late eighteenth century. The NYSE
was formed in 1793 to provide a place of trading.68 In its early days, it
focused on the means for trading to occur and be efficiently com-
pleted. 69 Over time, the exchange began to enter into contracts with
companies that sought to have their shares listed on the exchange.
To the extent that there were requirements for listing, they reflected
economic aspects that related to trading, such as the size of the com-
pany and the number of shares traded, items that did not relate
directly to corporate governance. During the nineteenth century,
stock exchange listing requirements began to include some provisions
that related to corporate governance. For example, in 1869, the NYSE
formed a Committee on Stock Lists to evaluate applications to list7O
and began to require share registration in an effort to eliminate
watered stock.71 Prior to 1900, the NYSE developed listing agree-
ments with each company whose shares were listed. What we refer to
today as listing standards were the guidelines for provisions to go into
those individual listing agreements. 72 In that setting, any change in
listing standards did not affect those with agreements that predated a
change, a characteristic that kept the standards from having uniform
application.
Listing standards generally served a business purpose. Professor
John Coffee has traced how the NYSE's policies over the nineteenth
century worked to attract foreign money to invest in American corpo-
68 For a description of the origins of the American stock exchange, see Stuart
Banner, The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791-1860, 27J. LEGAL STUD. 113,
119 (1998).
69 See STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION 250-51 (1998).
70 Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54
SMU L. REv. 325, 326 (2001). See generally LEFFLER, supra note 43, at 140 (providing
historical background on listing standards and noting that "[iln April, 1932, the
Exchange made the 1928 policy of independent audits mandatory for all new compa-
nies applying for listing").
71 James L. Cochrane, Senior Vice President, Strategy & Planning, New York
Stock Exchange, Inc., Presentation at the Vanderbilt University Law School & the
Owen Graduate School of Management: The NYSE and Corporate Governance (June
9, 2003) (on file with author).
72 Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing Standards
Under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 Bus. LAw. 1461, 1465 (1992).
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rations.73 His story is one of the evolution of the NYSE as a brand
name for a place that protected minority shareholders more so than
the exchanges of the Old World, although governance provisions per
se made up a modest part of that perception.7 4
During the twentieth century, "governance" listing standards
advanced in fits and starts, in part related to what state and federal law
were (or were not) doing. Three principal periods of activity are
visible.
1. Pre-Great Depression Standards
In the period prior to the enactment of the first federal securities
laws in 1933 and 1934, the NYSE required disclosure provisions
beyond those then (or now) required by state corporations law. By
the turn of the twentieth century, the exchange included in listing
agreements a provision that called for listed companies to issue regu-
lar financial statements. 75 This requirement was extended to semian-
nual disclosure in 1917 and to quarterly filings in 1923.76 In 1926, the
exchange added its one share/one vote requirement, 77 which reap-
pears later in this Article in the discussion of regulation during the
most recent period. The dual class stock that permitted investors with
a relatively small financial investment to control the voting shares of
the company78 aroused populist ire during the 1920s and led to a
stock exchange ban (rather than prohibitions in state corporations
73 John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Toward the Top? The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock
Market Competition on Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1757, 1770-73 (2002).
74 Id. at 1801-03.
75 GILBERT W. CooKE, THE STOCK MARKrs 340 (rev. ed. 1969). The effectiveness
of this requirement was qualified because until 1910 listing was not a requirement for
trading on the Exchange; the Exchange continued to maintain an "Unlisted Depart-
ment" that included many of the industrial stocks and these companies were not sub-
ject to the listing standards. See Robert Lang et al., Special Study on Market Structure,
Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57 Bus. LAW. 1487, 1497-98 (2002).
76 COOKE, supra note 75, at 340 (explaining that listing agreements contained
requirements for semiannual income statements and balance sheets by 1917 and
quarterly earnings by 1923).
77 See Seligman, supra note 49, at 693-99 (tracing the evolution of the NYSE
policy).
78 A.A. Berle, Jr., Non-Voting Stock and "Bankers' Control", 39 HARV. L. REv. 673,
674-76 (1926).
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law) .79 Listing requirements were extended in 1932 to require newly
listed companies to have independent audits.8 0
In this era, listing standards could be seen as a substitute for
government regulation. General corporation statutes had become
common by 1890.81 For another forty years there were no federal cor-
porate or securities laws, although proposals had been made since the
time of Theodore Roosevelt.8 2 The NYSE could argue that if listing
standards for securities adequately protected the investment public
then government regulation would be unnecessary.8 3
The entry of the federal government into this field, particularly
with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, overran this evolving trend.
The Act required that all companies with securities registered on a
national securities exchange (which did not include over-the-counter
stocks) must submit independently certified reports of financial
conditions.8 4 Section 13 of the 1934 Act required periodic reports,
both annual and quarterly, of listed companies.8 5 Other provisions of
the federal law regulated proxy solicitation8 6 and trading by insiders. 87
The Act also created the Securities and Exchange Commission, which
was given supervisory authority over exchanges.8 " Indeed, the
exchange was now defined as a "self-regulatory organization" by the
Act, 9 a cousin of other public-private agencies created by New Deal
79 See Banker's Control of Trade Deplored, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1925, at 27. The fol-
lowing year the reaction to the NYSE's announcement of a listing by Dodge Brothers,
Inc. with a dual class structure propelled the adoption of the NYSE standard. See
Seligman, supra note 49, at 694-98.
80 LEFFLER, supra note 43, at 140 ("In April, 1932, the Exchange made its 1928
policy of independent audits mandatory for all new companies applying for listing.").
81 HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 26 (3d ed.
1983).
82 Message to Congress on Dec. 3, 1901, in 15 THE WORKS OF TIEODOR ROOSEVELT
81, 92 (Hermann Hagedorn ed., 1926) ("The nation should, without interfering with
the power of the States in this matter itself, also assume power of supervision and
regulation over all corporations doing interstate business.").
83 See Max Lowenthal, The Stock Exchange and Protective Committee Securities, 33
COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1294-95 (1933); see also Stock Exchange Practices: Hearing on S.
Res. 84 Before the Subcomm. on Banking & Currency, 72d Cong. 286 (1932) (statement of
Richard Whitney, President, NYSE) ("The attitude of the exchange is constant
watchfulness.").
84 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2000).
85 Id. § 78m.
86 Id. § 78n.
87 Id. §78p.
88 Id. § 78d.
89 See id. § 78c(a)(26) (defining "self-regulatory organization" to mean any
national securities exchange or registered securities association). The NYSE has been
a national securities exchange since 1934. The SEC in 2006 approved Nasdaq's appli-
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legislation, some of which were stricken by 
Supreme Court deci-
sions.90 The Self Regulatory Organizations (SROs) aspect 
of the
exchange is most visible in its work to discipline 
broker-dealers, but
this statutory structure, including amendments 
made in 1975, also
becomes relevant to later action on listing standards.
2. Changes to Listing Standards in the 1950s
With the adoption of the federal securities 
legislation, listing
requirements remained stable into the 1950s.
9
" Then, over a period
of eight years, the exchange added a series 
of governance require-
ments that, for the most part, covered topics 
that would have been
included in state corporations codes. After 
the passage of the federal
securities laws, it became common to divide 
the realms relating to cor-
porate governance into the state realm, which 
covered internal corpo-
rate relations among directors, shareholders, 
and officers, and the
federal realm, which was mostly concerned 
with markets and some
discrete transactions that took place on markets, 
often framed as
requiring disclosure to investors. Against this 
backdrop, the changes
made in the 1950s clearly addressed matters 
that fit in the state law
realm. These included:
* In 1953, the listing standards specified a minimum 
level necessary
to achieve a quorum for shareholder action.
92 State corporations
statutes at the time typically provided for a quorum 
but there was
great variation and also broad flexibility for corporations 
to dilute
the requirement in their charter or bylaws.
" In 1955, the listing requirements required 
shareholders to
approve conflict of interest transactions or acquisitions 
in which
the number of shares increased by more 
than twenty percent.
93
The first is typically dealt with under state corporations 
law by
judicial decisions after the fact deciding whether board action 
in
cation to be an exchange, after a five-year delay. 
See In the Matter of the Application
of the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC for Registration as a 
National Security Exchange,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-53128, 71 Fed. Reg. 
3,550, 3,566 (Jan. 23, 2006).
90 See supra note 50.
91 Michael, supra note 72, at 1469 ("With one minor addition, 
the extension of
minimum voting rights to preferred stock in 1940, 
the NYSE's corporate governance
listing standards had remained essentially unchanged 
from 1926 [to the 1950s].").
92 Id.
93 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, 4 SECURITIES 
REGULATION 1827 (3d ed. 1990)
(describing a November 1955 action by the NYSE Board of Governors 
based on an
increase in outstanding shares of twenty percent or 
more); see NYSE, LisTED COMPANY
MANUAL § 312.03(c) (2006).
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a conflict situation was a breach of fiduciary duty.94 State statutes
passed during this period to clarify the common law were written
in the negative-conflict transactions were not void or voidable
solely because of that conflict if they received shareholder
approval, 9 5 In contrast, the new stock exchange requirements
were written to require positive action. As to the requirement of
shareholder approval, this was a powerful addition to the rela-
tively short list of corporate actions that require shareholder
approval, thereby extending the shareholder franchise to transac-
tions that would not be covered by state law.9 6 This provision, for
example, required shareholder voting by Time, Inc. shareholders
of the initial Time/Warner combination proposed in the classic
Time/Warner/Paramount takeover battle in the 1980s even
though Delaware law did not require such a vote.9 7
" In 1956, the listing standards were amended to require two
outside directors, an independence requirement still not
addressed by state corporations law today.98
" In 1959, a change to the listing standard required listed compa-
nies to solicit proxies. 99 The result was to effectively widen the
reach of the federal disclosure system. Under federal law, disclo-
sure is triggered only by solicitation of proxies, so that if proxies
were not solicited, no disclosure would occur.10 0
* In 1960, the listing standards required disclosure of change of
control, 0 '1 a provision that could (and later did) come under fed-
eral disclosure law. 10 2
These changes coincided with a broad campaign identified with
NYSE President Keith Funston to court small investors and to combat
94 See, e.g., Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 121 N.E. 378, 380-81 (N.Y.
1918) (invalidating conflict transaction when director and chair of executive commit-
tee of one company was the chief shareholder of the counterparty). But see MODEL
Bus. CORP. AcT § 8.60 (2005) (defining a "director's conflicting interest transaction").
95 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001).
96 State law typically provides for shareholder election of directors and share-
holder approval of director-initiated action to merge, sell substantially all of the cor-
poration's assets, or dissolve. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 11.02, 12.01, 13.02
(2005).
97 Paramount Commc'n, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935, 1989 WL
79880, at *26 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989) ("Delaware law created no fight... to vote on
the original Warner merger .... [lilt was only NYSE rules that prompted the pro-
posed submission of that transaction to the Time annual meeting.").
98 Michael, supra note 72, at 1469.
99 H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, pt. 4, at 568 (1963).
100 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2000).
101 H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, pt. 4, at 568.
102 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
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falling trade volume resulting from a rising concentration of shares in
the hands of large institutions.1 0 3 Corporate democracy was seen as
essential to reaching more of these individual investors. Professor
Michael has noted, "[t]he listing standards of the day were pitched
with the individual investor in mind, heralded by the NYSE as further-
ing 'broader share ownership' with 'greater shareowner participation
in corporate affairs.'" 1 0 4
After 1960, there was another stable period in terms of the form
of the listing standards that extended until the post-Watergate revela-
tions as to bribery and other corporate wrongdoing provided a suffi-
cient push for enactment of new listing standards. A change in the
listing standards to require an audit committee made up of indepen-
dent directors ushered in the latest round of listing standards
changes, one that has a different look to it than the earlier two.
3. Changes to the Listing Standards in the Modern Period
There have been four sets of listing standards during the modern
period: (1) prescribing audit committee functions first addressed in
1977, revisited in 1998 and made a part of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002; (2)
one share/one vote requirements, a reprise of the listing standards
first inserted in 1926 that evolved through a series of events from 1986
to 1994 leading to a modern version of that older standard; (3) requir-
ing shareholder participation in approval of compensation plans, a
reprise of the standard from the 1950s that was the subject of exten-
sive revision process from 1998 to 2003; and (4) the 2002 post-Enron/
WorldCom proposals empowering independent directors.
These changes differ from those described in the two earlier eras
in significant ways. First, the "standards" moniker no longer seems to
apply. Unlike previous iterations, which were standards to be
included in individual listing contracts and did not bind, other than
by persuasive efforts, companies who had signed listing agreements
earlier, these standards look more like mandatory law and are written
to apply to all listed companies. There is nothing like the dramatic
change that occurred after the Supreme Court's decision in Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward 05 that had found state corporations
charters to be contracts that could not be unilaterally changed by gov-
103 See ROBERT SOBEL, NYSE: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YoRK STOCK EXCHANGE,
1935-1975, at 199-200 (1975).
104 Michael, supra note 72, at 1470 (quoting releases from 1959 and 1960,
announcing listing standards regarding mandatory solicitation of proxies and addi-
tional shareholder voting requirements, respectively).
105 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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eminent. 0 6 This ruling led to changes in state corporations statutes
that explicitly bound corporations to any subsequent changes in the
statute. 107 The NYSE standards do not have such a provision. Never-
theless, the listing standards of the modern period are written as if
there were such a provision.
Second, the agenda appears to be that of the SEC more than the
stock exchange. The trigger fcr the process .yically was the SEC
chair calling for action by the exchanges.' 08 There was not a standing
committee of the exchange looking for changes that needed to be
made. SEC attention continued through the process, including prod-
ding if the process did not evolve satisfactorily. This SEC involvement
was often accompanied by a statement to the effect that the agency
could do it, but it would be really good if it came from the private
sector. Yet the subject matter, the duties of directors, and the relative
rights of shareholders in corporate governance issues, lies at the core
of state corporations law and stands as the most likely to run afoul of
federalism concerns.
a. One Share/One Vote
Changes in the one share/one vote rule beginning in the late
19 80s reflect the modern evolution of listing standards. As discussed
above, the NYSE had had a one share/one vote rule prohibiting dual
class shares since 1926 (with a notable exception in 1956 when Ford
Motor Company went public using a dual class structure that permit-
ted the Ford family to maintain a leadership role in the company). 10 9
Developments in the 1980s provoked a major challenge to the status
quo. The takeover wave of the early 1980s threatened corporate man-
agers in many American companies, leading to a wave of anti-takeover
defenses including use of dual class shares. The interest in America's
largest companies, including General Motors, which had acquired
EDS and wanted to have multiple classes of stock to reflect that acqui-
sition, led to pressure on the NYSE to liberalize its sixty-year-old rule.
At the same time, the Amex permitted dual class stock pursuant to its
106 See id. at 594 (holding that a corporate charter is a contract between the corpo-
ration and the state so that unless the state granted the charter subject to a reserved
power to repeal or amend it, any subsequent change would be an unconstitutional
impairment of contract).
107 After the Dartmouth College case, the power to amend corporate charters via
subsequent amendment in corporations statutes has been reserved by the states. See
DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 364 (2001).
108 See infra text accompanying notes 120-21.
109 Seligman, supra note 49, at 693-99.
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"Wang formula" that permitted one-tenth of one vote per share. 110
The growth in the Nasdaq market created new exposure to possible
loss of business if the NYSE was to maintain the more restrictive
rule. 1 ' In 1984, the NYSE announced a moratorium on delisting for
dual classes, appointed a committee to reevaluate its policy, and in
1986 modified its rule. 2 This led to congressional hearings, SEC
efforts to persuade the exchanges to adopt a uniform rule, and finally
in 1988, SEC adoption of its own rule, Rule 19c-4, that limited future
midstream adoption of a dual class structure.1 3 Two years later a fed-
eral appellate court threw out that rule as beyond the SEC's power to
effectuate-it was a substantive intrusion into corporate governance
regulated by state law and beyond the disclosure-based provisions
authorized by the 1934 Act. 1 4 In the aftermath of that decision, both
the SEC and the NYSE voiced support for an exchange rule that
would return to the status quo, since an exchange rule was not the
federal government for purposes that would come under the court's
holding. But it took the SEC four additional years to get all of the
exchanges on the same page and to prevent differences in rules
among the exchanges from being a basis for competition for list-
ings." 5 The SEC was able to accomplish indirectly via listing stan-
dards what it had not been able to do directly by rule in terms of what
it saw as a need to protect shareholders from possible actions of man-
agement to entrench themselves.
b. Audit Committees
Audit committees are a committee of a corporation's board of
directors and as such are subject to whatever requirements may be
imposed in state corporations law as to who directors are and how
they act. There are none. Since 1977 there have been three different
110 Karmel, supra note 70, at 331 (describing Amex decision to list Wang Labora-
tories, Inc. even though it had been rejected by the NYSE because of unequal voting
rights and subsequent following of the Wang formula).
S11 See Seligman, supra note 49, at 704-06.
112 Voting Rights Listing Standards: Disenfranchisement Rule, Exchange Act
Release No. 25,891, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,376, 27,016 (July 12, 1986).
113 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (2006).
114 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
115 See Lang et al., supra note 75, at 1505-06 (describing SEC efforts to first get the
NYSE to adopt a rule, then the Nasdaq, but resistance by the Amex leading to a sug-
gestion by the SEC chair that Congress consider identifying minimum federal protec-
tions for voting rights); see also Amy L. Goodman, One Share/One Vote ... Again,
INSIGHTS, June 1991, at 2 (describing additional pressure from the Council of Institu-
tional Investors and others on the exchanges).
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changes to listing standards to ratchet up the duties 
of this committee,
each one reflecting the pattern of SEC dominance 
seen in the mod-
ern period. SEC interest in the composition of audit 
committees actu-
ally goes back longer than that-to the 1940s 
when the agency first
began to recommend (but not require) that public corporation 
audit
committees be comprised of independent directors.
1 6 In the 1970s
in the aftermath of post-Watergate revelations 
of improper payments
by large numbers of corporations, the agency pushed 
listing standard
changes to strengthen audit committee independence."
7 An SEC
release making the case for such a rule suggested 
that it come from
the NYSE.118 Thus, in 1977 the NYSE modified 
its standards to
require listed companies to have an audit committee 
of independent
directors. 119 Concern over earnings management 
in the 1990s pro-
duced a similar pattern of activity. Arthur Levitt, 
then the SEC chair-
man, made a widely publicized speech about 
the danger of then
current practices 2 He stated the agency stood ready 
to take action,
but that a private sector response seemed wiser.
121 One difference
from two decades earlier was that this time, the 
NYSE was joined by
the Nasdaq in appointing a blue ribbon commission.
122 The result
was a commission report within months and listing 
standards enacted
within another year requiring that audit committee 
members be both
independent and have financial literacy.
1 23 Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002
codified both the independence and the financial 
literacy require-
116 See McKesson & Robbins, Inc., Accounting 
Series Release No. 19, Exchange
Act Release No. 2,707 [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
62,020, at 62,104, 62,108 (Dec. 5, 1940).
117 Homer Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance, 
and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAw.
173, 190 (1981).
118 New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange 
Act Release No. 13,346, 42 Fed.
Reg. 14,793, 14,794 (Mar. 15, 1977).
119 See ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 
152 (1982) ("The voluntari-
ness of the New York Stock Exchange's adoption 
of the rule is debatable."); Kripke,
supra note 117, at 190 ("[T]o characterize the New York 
Stock Exchange's action
as ... voluntary .. . is unreal.").
120 Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chairman, SEC, 
Remarks at the NYU Center for Law and
Business: The "Numbers Game" (Sept. 28, 1998), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/speecharchive/ 1998/spch220 
txt.
121 Id.
122 See Press Release, SEC News Release 
No. 98-96, SEC, NYSE and NASD
Announce Blue Ribbon Panel to Improve Corporate 
Audit Committees (Sept. 28,
1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/pressarchive 
1998/98-96.txt.
123 See Lang et al., supra note 75, at 1508-09 
("The forum approach to corporate
governance rulemaking, exemplified by 'broad-based 
dialogue . . . between [the
SEC], academia, the legal community, and issuers' had, with 
the support of the SEC,
prevailed over the process of unilateral action 
by the SEC.").
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ments from the earlier rounds of listing standards revisions, and also
mandated new audit committee practices such as the committee hir-
ing and firing the auditor.12 4 As to the audit committee, these
changes overran listing standard changes proposed by the NYSE and
Nasdaq in 2002 requiring the audit committee, as well as the nominat-
ing and compensation committee, to be made up entirely of indepen-
dent directors. 125
c. Shareholder Approval of Compensation Plans
During the period between 1998 and 2003, the NYSE and the
SEC engaged in another dance over empowering shareholders to vote
on certain compensation plans similar to what had gone on with one
share/one vote and audit committees. Recall the earlier listing stan-
dards that required shareholder approval of conflict transactions and
certain other corporate actions. 126 Under these standards, the NYSE
required shareholder approval of broad-based options plans. As part
of a 1998 codification of its practices in this regard, the NYSE pro-
vided for exemptions from shareholder voting for certain compensa-
tion plans. 127 After the exemption had been subjected to and
received SEC approval pursuant to a process that included a public
notice filing and an opportunity for interested parties to comment,
some institutional investors complained that the changed language
was too generous to managers.1 28 The NYSE responded to the new
concerns by issuing a white paper, requesting additional comments,
and asking a task force to make recommendations. 29 This led to a
temporary rule with a narrower definition of "what was broad
based."'130 SEC Chairmen Arthur Levitt and Harvey Pitt both pushed
124 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
125 The report of the NYSE committee to its board in June 2002 required that the
audit committee be composed entirely of independent directors. By the time this was
approved by the NYSE board and sent to the SEC for approval, Sarbanes-Oxley had
intervened with a more stringent standard. See NYSE, supra note 42 (requiring
greater independence for directors); see also NAT'L Ass'N or SECURITIES DEALERS, INC.,
supra note 42, at 3-4, 12 (proposing revisions to Nasdaq listing requirements, includ-
ing a requirement that boards have a majority of independent directors and that
directors meet without company management).
126 See supra text accompanying note 93.
127 See Lang et al., supra note 75, at 1509.
128 Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Changes by the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc., Relating to Shareholder Approval Policy, Exchange Act Release No.
39,839, 66 SEC Docket 2131 (Apr. 8, 1998).
129 See Lang et al., supra note 75, at 1509.
130 Id.
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for shareholder protection in this area of listing standards,13 but it
took four years before the new listing standards were approved as part
of the broader set of listing changes enacted after Enron.132
d. Independent Directors
The parallel proposals made by the NYSE and Nasdaq in the
aftermath of Enron are the single event that best illustrates the newly
empowered status of stock exchange listing requirements.13 3 As with
the second audit committee requirements described above, these pro-
posed changes followed a pattern of the NYSE and Nasdaq moving
along parallel lines. As with the audit committee, shareholder
approval, and one share/one vote, these changes had the SEC as their
initiator and the government exercising the biggest say on what even-
tually made their way into the listings standards. This time it was a
suggestion from SEC chairman Harvey Pitt, in February 2002, three
months after Enron had gone belly-up, that the NYSE and Nasdaq
should move on corporate governance standards) 34
The NYSE quickly appointed a blue ribbon committee co-chaired
by high profile figures-Leon Panetta, former Chief of Staff for Presi-
dent Clinton, Gerald Levin, former Time Warner CEO, and Carl
McCall, an influential New York political figure. Within four months
of the first call, the committee had held a series of hearings and made
recommendations to the NYSE board of directors. 35 Approval of the
board followed in sixty days and then submission to the SEC. But in
those sixty days, Sarbanes-Oxley had gone from unlikely legislation to
a freight train of reform that gathered new provisions quickly and was
131 Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the
Securities Industry Association (Nov. 9, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch420.htm (urging the markets "to restore promptly the rightful balance
between shareholder and management interests by requiring shareholder approval
for all plans that grant options or award stock to officers and directors"); Harvey Pitt,
Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the Inaugural Lecture of the JD/MBA Lecture Series at
Northwestern Law School (Apr. 4, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch547.htm ("We will have to make it clear ... that although it was a
request, it was expected to be implemented. They should move with alacrity.").
132 In the Matter of David S. Pearl, Exchange Act Release No. 48,257, 80 SEC
Docket 2771 (July 30, 2003).
133 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
134 Press Release, SEC, News Release No. 2002-23, Pitt Seeks Review of Corporate
Governance, Conduct Codes (Feb. 13, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2002-23.txt.
135 NYSE, New York Stock Exchange Corporate Accountability and Listing Stan-
dards Committee 6-24 (2002), available at http://www.iasplus.com/resource/
nysegovf.pdf.
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signed by the President by the end ofJuly.1 3 6 The statute superseded
much of what the listing standard process had recommended about
audit committees. 137 Over the succeeding months, the part of the list-
ing standards proposal about shareholder approval was broken off
from the main proposal and approved by the SEC. The remainder of
the listing proposals received SEC approval in November 2003.138
III. MODELING THE CREATION OF STOCK
EXCHANGE LISTING STANDARDS
How ought we model a stock exchange as a lawgiver on corporate
governance matters? Economic incentives of exchanges and their
owners provide motivations for rulemaking that can explain the
pattern of changes to listing standards. This Part develops how
changes in technology and organizational structure have modified the
traditional incentives. These changed incentives and the historical
pattern described above suggests an alternative theory to the pure
market explanation for promulgation of listing standards. The SEC is
trying to get the stock exchanges to do what the agency fears the fed-
eral courts will not let it do directly, and which, until the next Enron,
will not provide Congress sufficient reason to authorize additional fed-
eral intrusion into the area traditionally regulated by state law.
A. Traditional Economic Incentives for Exchanges to
Provide Efficient Listing Standards
Exchanges owned by participants who profit when trading occurs
there have an economic incentive to provide listing standards that will
encourage investors to trade there and companies to list that stock for
trading there. These participants will push their directors and manag-
ers to adopt listing standards that maximize income from trading on
the exchange. For exchanges, this means rules that assure investors
that they will not be taken advantage of, and that trading costs are
efficient, but it also means rules that differentiate the quality of com-
panies listed on one exchange from others. Recall Professor Coffee's
136 See Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 2 Pub. Papers 1319,
1319-21 (July 30, 2002).
137 The NYSE proposal, approved by the NYSE board in June 2002, contained a
requirement for an audit committee (as well as the compensation and governance
committee) made up entirely of independent directors. See Lang et al., supra note 75,
at 1506-09. The bill enacted into law the following month included the requirement
for the audit committee only. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000).
138 Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,745, 81 SEC
Docket 2082 (Nov. 4, 2003).
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story of the New York Stock Exchange in the nineteenth century,
when it lacked the preeminence among American equity exchanges
that it has today; he observed the success that it had in establishing a
brand name redounded to the benefit of those who bought and sold
securities there. 13
9
These economic incentives suggest the possibility of competition
among providers of these services. As demonstrated in the previous
Part, many of the stock exchanges listing standards as to corporate
governance fill gaps, usually where neither state nor federal law have
previously provided a rule. In our current economy there is more
than one potential provider of such rules among stock exchanges.
Just as the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq compete for stocks
to be traded, they could use governance listing requirements as a
means to compete for listings and for the trades that follow those list-
ings. And these exchanges, in turn, can compete with the governance
packages offered by either the state or federal government. As securi-
ties trading increasingly crosses national boundaries, stock exchanges
will be able to compete with exchanges elsewhere, with listing require-
ments as one means for such competition.
If there were to be such competition, would it be a race to the
bottom as William Cary labeled corporate law in the 1970s140 and what
Louis Brandeis labeled in the early twentieth century as a race of
laxity?14' Each author was concerned about the willingness of state
legislators to provide laws tilted toward management and against
shareholders. Cary noted that it is management who chooses where
to incorporate, and that in making that choice, we should not be
surprised if they choose a state whose laws are comforting to manage-
ment.1 42 The counterargument made by Judge Ralph Winter in his
days as an academic 143 and by his academic colleagues such as
Roberta Romano, is that the market for shares not only counters this
tendency but insures a race to the top.144 If managers choose to
139 Coffee, supra note 73, at 1828-29.
140 William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663, 666 (1974).
141 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557-60 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing in part) ("Lesser states, eager for revenue derived from that traffic in charters,
had removed safeguards for their own incorporation laws.... The race was not one of
diligence but of laxity.").
142 Cary, supra note 140, at 666.
143 Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corpo-
ration, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 257-58 (1977).
144 ROBERTA RoMANO, THE GENIUS oF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAw 14-24 (1993); see
also Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments
in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 913, 920 (1983) ("Delaware's preemi-
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
incorporate in a state with lax laws that permit managers to take
advantage of their position, the company's performance will suffer as
compared to comparable companies in states without such lax laws.
Governance rules set by stock exchanges exhibit similar core
characteristics to the making of state corporations law. Directors, not
shareholders, choose where the corporation's stock is to be traded. 145
The exchanges have the same incentives as do state legislatures to
shape their listing requirements so as to appeal to management and
thereby obtain the fees that come from listing and profits that accrue
from additional trading. If shareholders have a contrary view, it is very
difficult for shareholders to overturn the directors' decision. To
change the place of incorporation would require filing a new charter,
or amending the charter or approving a merger. In each, directors
have a gatekeeper position by state law that prevents shareholder initi-
ation.1 46 Efforts to change a place of listing have been similarly insu-
lated. Until its removal in 2003, NYSE Rule 500 required
supermajority votes of the board and shareholders before a change of
listing was possible.1 47 Even with the relaxation of that rule, efforts to
change the place of listing necessarily go through the directors.
Shareholders might be able to accomplish such a change against the
wishes of the directors by directly amending the bylaws at an annual
meeting, but Delaware courts have yet to decide whether such action
would interfere with the plenary power given to the directors by stat-
ute to run the corporation.' 4 8
Thus the most likely constraint on stock exchanges will be the
principal learning from the race to the top literature. At some point,
if an exchange has inefficient governance rules that contribute to a
loss of value for those stocks relative to stocks traded on another
exchange, investors will bid down the stocks traded on an exchange
nence, in short, is in all probability attributable to success in a 'climb to the top'
rather than a victory in a 'race to the bottom.'").
145 This comes within the provisions of DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141 (a) (2001)
that all corporate power shall be exercised by the board.
146 Id. § 261.
147 Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,435, 68 Fed. Reg.
175 (Sept. 10, 2003).
148 Delaware state law permits shareholders to initiate changes to the bylaws with-
out depending upon director action. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2001). Delaware
courts have declined to take up the issue as to whether such shareholder exercise of
bylaws can be used to impinge on the plenary power given to directors under the
Delaware Code, Id. § 141 (2001 & Supp. 2002 & Interim Supp. 2005 & 2006-1 Del.
Code Ann. Adv. Leg. Serv. 228 (LexisNexis)), that all corporate power is to be exer-
cised by or under the authority of the board of directors unless a contrary rule is set
out in the company's articles of incorporation, not the bylaws.
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with the management preferring rules. Professor Fischel put it this
way:
If an exchange allows managers of some firms to exploit inves-
tors, investors will lose confidence in the exchange, as a whole, caus-
ing all firms on the exchange to face higher costs of capital. This in
turn will decrease the amount of listings in the future and thus also
will reduce the amount of trade. Loss of confidence in the
exchange also will lead to a decline in the value of listed securities.
A decline in the value of listed securities, like a decline in the
amount of trade, will decrease income from commissions. And any
action that decreases commission income will decrease the value of
membership on the exchange. Thus, any decrease in the amount of
trade or value of securities listed on the exchange reduces the
wealth of member firms. Once again, it is clear that the profit-maxi-
mizing strategy for an exchange is to promulgate rules that maxi-
mize, not minimize, investors' welfare. 149
Empirical evidence as to such competition is, as yet, incomplete.
A good bit of work has been done on testing the hypothesis that Dela-
ware state law, as opposed to another state's, creates or reduces value.
Earlier studies focused on whether firms that reincorporate in Dela-
ware experience lower stock prices. 50 More recent studies have
addressed whether Delaware firms differ from other firms based on
economic measures such as Tobin's Q15S1 Similar studies that sought
to measure gains when the primary listing of a firm moved between
exchanges showed mixed results.152 The difficulty with drawing firm
conclusions in this area is that these studies will usually measure a
combination of any change in governance and any change in trading
technology that occurs when trading of a company's stock moves
149 Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common
Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 129-30 (1987).
150 Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy
Competition" Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259, 266-67 (1980); Roberta Romano,
Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 225, 265-73
(1985).
151 Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525,
529-30, 547-49 (2001) (finding that Delaware firms are generally worth more than
firms incorporated elsewhere using Tobin's Q as a measure of financial perform-
ance). But see Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 32, 41-43 (2004) (finding the difference did not continue outside the original
time period and for larger firms).
152 Gary C. Sanger & John J. McConnell, Stock Exchange Listings, Firm Value and
Security Market Efficiency: The Impact of NASDAQ 21 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1,
22 (1986) (finding price response to announcement to list on NYSE was positive
before and after the introduction of Nasdaq, but statistically significant only in the
pre-Nasdaq period).
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between exchanges. Studies during the last decade point to real dif-
ferences between the NYSE and Nasdaq as to the trading costs during
a time that Nasdaq avoided trading at odd-eighths pricing intervals.15 3
Although those differences seemed to have disappeared with the
move to decimal trading, there remain some differences as to trading
technology between the NYSE open outcry auction, even with the
great automation that has been introduced into that system, and the
Nasdaq's use of dispersed market-makers. 15 4 These changes are likely
to dominate any differences in governance listing standards in the
move between exchanges, particularly since the modern trend, dis-
cussed below, reflects no competition between the exchanges based
on differences in listing standards. 155
A model of stock exchanges as lawgivers ought to incorporate the
quasi-public role they have played since 1934 and their explicit desig-
nation as SROs. The exchanges as SROs date back to an era in which
President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal made extensive use of private
or quasi-public bodies to make public policy, some of which did not
survive constitutional attack and others such as SROs in the securities
industry that did. They reflect a model based on the role of govern-
ment (here the federal government) facilitating rulemaking by a pri-
vate institutions, here the stock exchanges. Such an approach,
illustrated by scholars sometimes grouped under the banner of the
New Institutional Economics include examples based on the Maghribi
153 William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Why do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid
Odd-Eighth Quotes?, 49J. FIN. 1813, 1814 (1994) (finding that market makers avoided
quoting prices in four of the eight price points available for their bid and ask quotes,
thus effectively doubling the cost of transactions by investors).
154 Hendrik Bessembinder, Trade Execution Costs on NASDAQ and the NYSE: A Post-
Reform Comparison, 34 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIs 387, 405-06 (1999).
155 Mark Roe presents Delaware as not in a race with other states to create corpo-
rate law, but rather in a vertical relationship with the federal government in which
Delaware makes law in the space only where the federal government does not choose
to preempt. MarkJ. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REv. 590, 601 (2003).
He provides examples from the last two decades in which the federal lawgivers exer-
cised gravitational pull on the substance of state law and then released it and suggests,
for example, that Delaware's anti-takeover law became stronger after the feds more or
less left the field. Id. at 618-19, 630-32. Similarly, the stock exchanges could be seen
to occupy a similar relationship. Their listing standards occupy space that the federal
government has not chosen to occupy. As with state government, rule-making by
stock exchanges must occur in the shadow of federal power. But, less so than the
states, the exchanges cannot be easily described as chomping at the bit, desirous of
imposing additional listing standards, and held back by the threat of countervailing
federal legislation. Id. at 619-20.
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tribes 156 or the law merchant'5 7 to take advantage of when private gov-
ernance will have a relative advantage over rules made by
government. 
58
Governance rules by stock exchanges can fit within such a model.
Stock exchanges have strong economic incentives to develop efficient
rules and bring to the task efficiencies that sometime give them advan-
tages over government. The incentives are well-known and have
already been mentioned. Maintaining the value of the listing gives a
strong self-interest to exchanges to adopt efficient rules.159 This value
can depend both on institutional structure, such as how trading takes
place, and factors relating to individual companies, of which govern-
ance would be a relevant factor. Professor Mahoney has suggested
that exchanges can create value that investors would find attractive by
reducing the divergence among their listed companies by addressing
factors such as the reliability of contracts, the absence of fraud, the
creditworthiness of companies, and the quality and validity of the
securities themselves.1 60
The exchanges traditionally have had several efficiencies, as com-
pared to government, that argued for their undertaking these func-
tions. Exchanges are made up of repeat players in these kinds of
transactions with the incentives and efficiency that come with that.
They are made of participants who are recognized to be more knowl-
edgeable in these subjects than any corresponding group in govern-
ment. Some of the information needed for enforcement can be
gathered in the normal course of trading securities. Even more, there
is a likelihood that over history there has been some cross-subsidiza-
tion that the bundling of trading, enforcement and other services
under the exchange banner has permitted some of the surplus gener-
ated by the trading business to be used for enforcement. There have
been some economies of scale in enforcement that derive from a
156 Avner Greif et al., Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the
Merchant Guild, 102J. POL. ECON. 745, 746 (1994).
157 Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of
Decentralized Law, 14 INF'L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 216 (1994).
158 Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1293, 1295-97 (1996). See generally
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE 73-82 (1990) (arguing that the parties to a transaction have particularized
knowledge that reduces transaction costs, as well as a unique incentive to create insti-
tutions to resolve disputes and facilitate commerce).
159 Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities Regula-
tion in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563, 570 (2005).
160 Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REv. 1453, 1457-64
(1997).
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centralized market. More importantly, the exchange has traditionally
been a closely-knit community that has reduced transaction costs.
The monopoly rents that members could obtain from being on the
exchange gave them an incentive to support the internal governance
structure.
B. Changes in the Function and Ownership of Exchanges
Technology and regulatory change have dramatically modified
the economic context in which exchanges operate. Liquidity has
been a prime economic benefit provided by exchanges, along with
monitoring of nefarious trading practices and providing a brand
name label for companies traded on the exchange. The challenge for
the exchange has been that close substitutes have developed for each
of its functions.16' The NYSE's open-outcry auction was thought over
time to have provided relatively greater liquidity because the floor
brokers and specialists located at one central place provided depth of
quotations and trading. With the growth of computing power and
electronic interconnectivity, liquidity can now be provided in different
ways that are more decentralized and fragmented. Technology has
permitted individual traders to provide more liquidity and larger insti-
tutional traders can move between markets to provide liquidity, lessen-
ing the advantage of the centralized open-outcry exchange. The end
of fixed commissions and the reduction in spreads has made the trad-
ing market more competitive, reducing the value that members
obtain by their membership on an exchange.162
Technology likewise has decreased some of the firm-specific
values of those who owned the exchange and simultaneously has
increased the need for capital to innovate and compete with markets
around the world. In this context, the relative value of mutual,
nonprofit ownership has dissipated. Public forms of ownership have
swept exchanges around the world, as evidenced most recently by the
NYSE's new public status.1 16 This has put new pressure on ancillary
services traditionally provided by exchanges such as regulation of the
conduct of intermediaries who function in such exchanges and listing
standards for companies whose shares are traded on such exchanges.
161 Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of
Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1006,
1010-24 (1990).
162 See Adoption of Securities Exchange Act Rule 19b-3, Exchange Act Release No.
11,203, 6 SEC Docket 147 Uan. 23, 1975) (promulgating Rule 19b-3, effective May 1,
1975, which prohibited any exchange from requiring fixed commission rates).
163 Macey & O'Hara, supra note 159, at 564 (noting that with New York going
public, nine of the top ten world equity exchanges are publicly owned).
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The pressure on profit margins in a for-profit structure raises ques-
tions about resources diverted for developing and maintaining
enforcement. Regulation is the current focal point of this debate, but
the same issues generally apply for listing standards. 164
The NYSE has adopted a new system placing traditional regula-
tory functions within a separate not-for-profit subsidiary of the new
for-profit exchange and holding company. 165 The new subsidiary has
its own CEO and its own board and remains in the private sector.
Public comment on the proposal has raised questions about the ability
of a group located within a for-profit entity to provide sufficient
enforcement.' 66 Similar concerns arose three years ago as to whether
senior management of the exchange had sufficient reasons to ride
herd on the industry it regulated at a time when senior executives of
companies were exchange board members providing large salaries
and bonuses to those running the exchange t 67
Regulation is a cost of exchanges doing business, and the new
public owners of the exchanges are likely going to want to hold down
costs. At the same time, the learning of the traditional economic
model that exchanges and their owners benefit from high standards
for listed companies can still apply. But the pressures are different
today than even a decade ago. Trading costs, as measured by bid-ask
spreads (the profit intermediaries get for standing ready to make
market in stocks) have dropped dramatically, from more than 6.25
164 Id. at 596 (describing regulatory systems in other countries which include
some with a single government regulator, some with government oversight that
includes government oversight of listing and trading, and some with self-regulation
but with separation of operation and supervision).
165 The current corporate structure approved by the SEC in connection with the
merger, includes a parent NYSE Group, Inc., which includes separate entities for the
NYSE and Archipelago. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No.
53,382, 71 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (Feb. 27, 2006). This entity is also the only member of a
New York not-for-profit, NYSE Regulation, Inc., with directors somewhat separate
from the remaining part of the group.
166 The NYSE's prospectus when going public in early 2006 disclosed, "[t]he SEC
has also expressed concern about the conflicts of interest that may exist when a
for-profit entity owns an SRO." NYSE Group, Inc., Registration Statement Under the
Securities Act of 1933, at 25 (Apr. 26, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/ I 32657 9 /00 0 104746906005663/a2169294zs-1 a.htm. Discus-
sions continue as to possible hybrid approaches. See, e.g., Richard Hill, NASD Endorses
'Hybrid' Approach to Self-Regulation; NYSE More Reticent, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
1986, 1986-87 (Dec. 5, 2005). The NYSE and Nasdaq announced a combined regula-
tory unit in late 2006. See Press Release, SEC, Statement by SEC Chairman Cox at
News Conference on Self Regulation Consolidation (Nov. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-195.htm.
167 See supra Part lI.B.
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cents in the early 1990s to a low as a penny a share 
today for the
largest stocks16 8 The traditional not-for-profit, 
mutual organization
of exchange permitted them to fund things like 
regulation and gov-
ernance with the surplus generated in the trading 
function. 69 New
electronic markets seek to poach the territory 
of the existing
exchanges. 70 Markets in other countries are 
better able to attract
alternative listings, and in some of these countries 
regulation and its
costs have been shifted to the government.
1 71 To the extent that
changing economic incentives have seen exchange 
profit margins
competed away and given the changes in technology 
and trading prac-
tices, there may be fewer resources to devote 
to regulation and gov-
ernance, such that this function may not be 
sustainable as a stock
exchange function.
Government (particularly state government) already provides 
the
kinds of governance rules found in the recent 
listing standards. Do
exchanges have a relative advantage in providing 
such rules? The fed-
eral government, in fact, has gone to great lengths 
to quell the break-
out of any competition between exchanges 
over governance
standards. In each of the four primary examples 
of governance listing
standards discussed above, there has been a 
conscious effort by the
SEC to avoid competition. Former SEC Chairman 
Harvey Pitt
acknowledged the fear of competition directly, 
and suggested that the
reason for the reluctance of each exchange 
to create standards for
shareholder approval of option plans was 
the fear of creating a
competitive advantage in attracting companies 
for other exchanges.
1 72
An earlier NYSE task force on that topic warned 
against additional
rules that would get out in front of other exchanges 
because "with
regard to corporate governance, the leading securities 
markets should
seek to harmonize their rules in the best interests 
of investors, not to
compete on the basis of disparities in their rules."
17 3 The delay in
SEC approval of the stock exchange's post-Enron 
governance propos-
als for more than a year after they were submitted 
was attributed to
168 Hendrik Bessembinder, Trade Execution Costs 
and Market Quality After Decimaliza-
tion, 38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 747, 758 
(2003).
169 Pirrong, supra note 67, at 443.
170 See Joe Bet Bruno, Technology Taking Jobs at 
NYSE, CINCINNATI POST, Oct. 24,
2006, at B6.
171 See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 159, 
at 596.
172 Albert B. Crenshaw, SEC to Toughen Rule on 
Option Plans, WASH. POST, Dec. 20,
2001, at El.
173 THE TASK FORCE ON STOCKHOLDER 
APPROVAL POLICY, NYSE, REPORT OF 
THE
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE SPECIAL TASK 
FORCE ON STOCKHOLDER APPROVAL POLICY
(1999), available at http://nasdaqtrader.com/trader/2000/generalnews/common
stock.pdf.
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efforts to harmonize the rules of the various exchanges, 
similar to the
four-year process that was required before one 
share/one vote poli-
cies were implemented by the exchanges in the 
aftermath of the Busi-
ness Roundtable decision in 1990.174
C. A Model of Stock Exchange Listing Standards as Indirect Agency 
Rules
As developed above, the traditional economic 
incentives of
exchanges to provide corporate governance 
standards for companies
listed on their exchange have dramatically lessened 
in the last decade
and can be expected to be lesser still going forward. 
Listing standards
cover topics that can be, and are already, in 
the government's space
for providing corporate regulation. The pattern 
of governance regu-
lation from stock exchanges appears not to 
demonstrate exchange
behavior that we might expect were exchanges 
competing among
themselves for business, or were the exchanges 
seeking to fill whatever
space the federal government makes available 
to it, or if the federal
government were encouraging efficient rulemaking 
by a private col-
lective entity. Rather, the history seems to 
show more of a pattern of
the exchanges picking up the direct suggestion 
of the federal agency
which believes a change in policy is appropriate 
but prefers that the
impetus come from a private group, not the 
agency. If the impetus
was because the agency believed that the SRO's 
expertise provided the
basis for believing a new rule was needed, 
this would illustrate the
model in the prior subpart, but more likely there 
is a simpler federal-
ism explanation.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, despite 
the growth in
the exercise of federal power, feels real limits 
in what it is able to do
vis-A-vis corporate governance given the existing 
federal statutes and
judicial decisions such as Business Roundtable. Acting 
through the
SROs permits the agency to extend its reach 
further into the domain
traditionally reserved for state law than would 
be available to it if it
directly sought to promulgate the same substantive 
rule through fed-
eral regulation. The agency may give up 
something in this process
and the result may not be as close to its desired 
result as if it promul-
gated rules through the normal administrative 
procedure process.
But the alternative choice for an agency is not 
a different federal rule,
but the rule as determined by state law.
This lends itself to a richer strategic model 
drawn from political
science and public choice literature that the 
actor (here the agency)
would not necessarily adopt its most preferred 
position, but rather
174 See supra Part II.C.3.d.
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would only go so far toward that position as would not 
provoke the
federal courts to step in and block the rule. This can 
be depicted to
the accompanying figure where S is the status quo 
of the current state
law, A is the preferred position of the agency, and C is 
the position at
which point a federal court would be expected to 
strike down the
agency action as inconsistent with the existing congressional 
view on
federalism. By acting through exchange listing 
requirements, the
agency may be able to move the applicable rule 
to point E without
triggering a judicial finding of invalidity.
FIGURE 1
_ _ 
S C E A _ _
Least Intrusive 
Most Intrusive
My view is that most of the current debate over stock 
exchange
listing standards is taking place in the space between 
what the SEC
would like to do in an unconstrained world and 
the point at which it
thinks it would provoke a limiting judicial decision (i.e. in the space
between C and A on the spectrum depicted above). In this setting 
the
preferences of the SEC overshadow any distinct 
preference of the
exchange.
Why would the NYSE do the agency's bidding? To 
some extent
the agency and the exchange have formed a natural 
alliance over the
seventy years of self-regulation such that their goals 
are parallel. To
the extent that there are differences, the SEC may 
have more intense
feelings, particularly given the technological and 
regulatory changes
described earlier that have made listing standards 
less central to the
economic function of the exchange. And to the extent 
that there are
differences, the NYSE has compelling reasons to stay 
on the good side
of the federal agency that regulates stock exchanges. 
In the last two
years the NYSE has gone through massive changes 
as it has moved
from its traditional open-outcry auction model to 
one that relies much
more on an electronic platform.
175 In 2006 it announced a merger
that will take it into Europe.
176 It is fair to say that its business plan
has gone through a substantial revision. Its ability 
to continue to com-
pete effectively with its American counterpart 
and with other
exchanges worldwide was under real question in 
its traditional struc-
ture. At any number of points in the process, 
the response of the
175 See Steven Marlin, NYSE and Nasdaq Power 
Up Electronic Trading, INFORMA-
TIONWEEK, Apr. 25, 2005, at 22, 22.
176 Press Release, NYSE, NYSE Group and Euronext 
N.V. Agree to a Merger of
Equals (June 1, 2006), http://nyse.com/events/l149243294115"html 
(follow "NYSE
Group, Inc. and Euronext N.V. Agree to a Merger 
of Equals" hyperlink).
[VOL. 82:3
...... P T A. "zAW REVIEW
20071 CORPORATE FEDERALISM IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 1179
federal agency overseeing the regulation of the stock 
exchanges could
dramatically affect the ability of the NYSE to move 
into this new world
and the costs it would incur in such a move.
There are other examples of agencies seeking 
to use a SRO-type
body to put forward an agency agenda. For example, 
in the 1970s, the
Family Viewing Hour was promulgated by industry 
code, not by
agency action, yet the story told is that FCC chairman 
Richard Wiley
applied extensive governmental pressure including 
calls from the
White House and other government persuasive 
powers to achieve a
new standard in the industry.1
77 More recent examples include
ASCAP's determination of policy in the music 
industry or ICANN
determining internet names.
178 There are a variety of reasons why
industry rules will come from a private or quasi-public 
body. A legal
challenge to that model often occurs under question 
of state action-
is the particular action that purports to be private 
really performing a
public action such that various constitutional 
protections ought to
apply?' 79
Of course such a conflict turns upon the agency's 
willingness to
pursue a rulemaking agenda that is more activist 
than the status quo
provided by state law. It is not obvious that 
Republican-appointed
members of an agency like the SEC (split three-to-two between 
the
parties) would continue to push an agenda at the activist 
end of the
spectrum described above. Yet, the Republican-controlled 
SEC has
advanced not just the stock exchange regulations described 
here, but
also new regulation of hedge funds and mutual 
funds. 180 The col-
lapse of the dot-coin bubble and the fall of Enron 
likely have created a
different environment that has resulted in a more 
activist agency than
perhaps might be expected in an administration 
of the political views
of the current one.
177 See Glen 0. Robinson, The Electronic First 
Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47
DUKE L.J. 899, 919 (1998). For a longer description, see 
GEOFFREY COWAN, SEE No
EVIL 80-115 (1979). A federal district court found the chairman's 
action violated the
First Amendment. That opinion was vacated by 
the appellate court and remanded to
the FCC, at which point the NAB Code was dropped. 
See Writers Guild of Am. West,
Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated, 
609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir.
1980).
178 See Merges, supra note 158, at 1295-96.
179 See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary 
Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,
290-91 (2001).
180 See supra note 2.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
IV. Is INDIRECT AGENCY ACTION TO CHANGE THE FEDERALISM LINE
WITHIN AN AGENCY'S POWER?
The principal areas of stock exchange regulation in recent years
have been within the traditional domain of state corporations law.
Requiring most board members to be independent and mandating a
committee structure of the board to include only independent mem-
bers on key committees comes within no traditional federal policy.
The substance of voting rights of shareholders as specified in a one
share/one vote procedure is state law, as the D.C. Circuit directly told
the SEC in the Business Roundtable decision."" Whether shareholders
get to vote on compensation (as opposed to how the voting occurs) is
straight out of state corporations law. Even the composition of audit
committees and their financial literacy, seemed to be clearly within
the orbit of state law prior to congressional action in Sarbanes-Oxley.
So what is common to modem day governance listing require-
ments is that they intrude into the area traditionally decided by state
law. There may, of course, by very good reasons to change that law,
but doing it by stock exchange rule at the behest of the SEC seems
more directed to making the federalism decision more opaque and to
expand federal jurisdiction by the back door. This Part addresses how
the federal-state line might be changed, first by congressional action
and second by agency action.
A. Constitutional Limits on Congress Shifting the Federalism Line
Prior to the New Deal, corporate and securities laws were only
regulated within state law. Under President Franklin Roosevelt's
administration and in the wake of the market crash and subsequent
Great Depression, the federal government mandated disclosure in
various securities transactions and established additional regulation of
the secondary market in shares.18 2 As with other New Deal legislation,
these statutes were challenged as beyond the federal power. In the
first securities case to reach the Supreme Court, Jones v. SEC,' s3 a 1936
challenge to the SEC's issuance of a stop order for an initial public
offering (IPO), the Court passed by the constitutional claim decided
by the court below and confined its decision to the argument that
181 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("To argue that
Congress's 'equal regulation' mandate supports SEC control over corporate govern-
ance through national listing standards is to gamble that the court will accept a Com-
mission spin on a statutory fragment without even a glance at its context. Wrong
court, bad gamble.").
182 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa, 78a-78nn (2000).
183 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
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sought to reject the SEC action on procedural grounds. 18 4 Two years
later, in Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC,1 85 the Court again passed by
the constitutional challenge made to the SEC's power over reorganiza-
tion terms for breaking up public utilities, the most substantive of all
the SEC powers under the various New Deal statutes. 8 6 It was
another eight years before the Court subsequently upheld the consti-
tutionality of that statute.18 7 And from that point, the SEC's constitu-
tional position seemed secure. Stanley Reed, who had argued the
Jones case as solicitor general, and Robert Jackson, who had argued
the Electric Bond case as solicitor general, were appointed to the Court
along with William 0. Douglas, the chair of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Felix Frankfurter, who had organized the
redrafting of the Securities Act of 1933 in the first weeks of the new
administration, and other New Deal economic liberals such as Hugo
Black and Frank Murphy. Although United States v. Lopez18  and some
other decisions of a more recent vintage suggest that there may be
constitutional limits on congressional power under the commerce
clause, the regulation of large publicly held corporations seems easily
within Commerce Clause authority. 8 9
B. Federalism in the Absence of Specific Congressional Action
If Congress were to implement the listing standards (or the share-
holder access rules discussed below) the federalism issue would likely
disappear for the reasons discussed in the previous paragraphs. The
more complex question is whether an agency can shift the federalism
line as part of its delegated authority in the absence of congressional
action. To some extent this is a separation of powers argument as
much as a federalism one, but at the intersection of the two doctrines
it may be that federalism acts to limit agency actions more than it
would if Congress were to take the same action.
The decision in Business Roundtable is one of the few federal deci-
sions to address the impact of federalism on the SEC's authority. That
184 Id. at 26 ("Since here the only disclosed purpose for which the investigation
was undertaken had ceased to be legitimate, the power of the commission to proceed
with the inquiry necessarily came to an end.").
185 303 U.S. 419 (1938).
186 Id. at 439-43 (upholding registration requirement of the Public Utilities Hold-
ing Company Act, but not resolving constitutional challenges to substantive reorgani-
zation powers contained in the Act).
187 N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 710 (1946) (upholding constitutionality of
SEC power to direct the breakup of public utility holding companies).
188 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
189 See id. at 565-68.
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court placed the question within the context of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,190 the Supreme Court's
landmark decision of six years before upholding the EPA's interpreta-
tion of "statutory source."191 The Business Roundtable court observed
that "we owe the Commission deference under Chevron . . . even
though the case might be characterized as involving a limit on the
SEC's jurisdiction."' 92 That last caveat invokes a controversial limita-
tion that the Supreme Court had left undecided. In a notable set of
dueling opinions, Justice Scalia observed "it is plain that giving defer-
ence to an administrative interpretation of its statutory jurisdiction or
authority is both necessary and appropriate." 93 Justice Brennan
responded that deference is not appropriate as to jurisdiction. 9 4
In a subsequent case the Court expressed a preference for strict
statutory interpretation so as to avoid constitutional issues. There the
Court concluded that an agency interpretation of "navigable waters"
to include an abandoned gravel pit because it was used as a habitat for
migratory birds was not fairly supported by congressional legisla-
tion.1 95 The Court started from the assumption that that Congress
does not casually authorize the administrative agencies to push the
limits of congressional authority. The opinion by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist noted that this concern is particularly heightened when an
"administrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework by
permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power." 96
This suggests that the corporate governance rules via listing stan-
dards may be vulnerable to attack as inappropriate agency action.
Because of this federalism aspect the arguments that can be made
against these governance rules are stronger than those made against
mutual funds and hedge fund rules that were recently invalidated by
federal appellate courts.19 7 In those cases, plaintiffs argued the
agency had gone beyond the congressionally provided authority, but
190 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
191 Id. at 857-63.
192 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
193 Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 381 (1988);
see also Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HaRv. L. REv. 421, 467
(1987) (arguing that deference violates separation of powers).
194 Miss. Power, 487 U.S. at 386-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
195 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S.
159, 172 (2001) ("Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the
outer limits of Congress' power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended
that result.").
196 Id. at 173.
197 See supra note 2.
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neither court adopted a federalism argument. 98 At the same time,
the barriers to judicial invalidation occurring are significant. There is
likely to be a standing question. If the SEC approves stock exchange
rules via Section 19(b), who will have standing to question the action?
The appellate courts in the mutual fund and hedge fund cases have
given parties such as the Chamber of Commerce substantial latitude
to advance the arguments and that reasoning could apply to a chal-
lenge against the governance rules as well.199
Substantial corporate law has been made in the other gray areas
between federal and state law where standing is difficult, such as the
shareholder proxy rules. As previously noted, Congress chose to con-
fine the federal role in corporate governance to disclosure that would
make the shareholder power as given by state law more informed. 200
If state law did not give shareholder substantive rights vis-At-vis direc-
tors, federal law would not override that governance choice.
Yet, from the early 1940s, the SEC passed rules that made the line
between state and federal regulation fuzzy. The earliest iteration of
Rule 14a-8 permitted individual shareholders to submit proposals that
would be voted on via management's proxy solicitation prior to the
corporation's annual meeting.20' The rule requires that such a pro-
posal be "a proper subject for action by security holders" and since
198 Another example is the challenge to the agency's action enacting Regulation
FD. See Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release
No. 43154, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 15, 2000). In SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc.,
384 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), the court declined to rule on the question that
the regulation was beyond the authority provided in the statue, a question that turned
on the meaning of "filing" versus "disclosures to the public" without any additional
element of whether the agency was intruding into the state realm. Brief of Chamber
of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Motion to Dismiss
at 4-11, SECv. Siebel Sys., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 94 CV 5130)
(arguing that expanding the obligation of corporate executives beyond fiduciary or
similar relationship is a major policy decision properly made by Congress and not the
SEC). The trial court did not rule on this claim. See Seibel Sys., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d at
709 n.16.
199 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 896-97 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 138 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
200 But Business Roundtable did suggest that the SEC could do more than mandate
information and still stay within existing boundaries. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905
F.2d 406, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("Rule 14-4(b)(2) requires a proxy to provide some
mechanism for a security holder to withhold authority to vote for each nominee indi-
vidually .... It thus bars a kind of electoral tying arrangement, and may be supporta-
ble as a control over management's power to set the voting agenda, or . . .voting
procedure."). The SEC's recent proposals to require shareholder nominations in
some situations could come within that opening.
201 Solicitation of Proxies Under the Act, Exchange Act Release No. 3,047, 7 Fed.
Reg. 10,655, 10,656 (Dec. 22, 1942).
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1954 has included the provision that such questions are to be deter-
mined "under the laws of the issuer's domicile."20 2 By a regulatory
sleight of hand, the agency avoided any direct challenge to what has
become a strong empowerment of shareholders and a resetting of the
shareholder/director relationship. It added a note that while
mandatory provision that sought to require directors to do something
may well not be permissible under state law, precatory provisions
would be permissible. 20 3 More recently the note was expanded to
erect a presumption that a proposal phrased as a suggestion or recom-
mendation would be proper.20 4 The result has been to shift to federal
law the resolution of hundreds of issues that are realistically little
more than fights between shareholders and directors as to control of
the corporation. If courts have not been willing to use federalism as a
limit in that context, they may be more reluctant in a setting where
the SEC can argue it was merely discussing corporate governance with
the exchanges or lobbying for private action.
After Enron the SEC proposed but never enacted an expansion
of the proxy rules that would have permitted shareholders to nomi-
nate directors if certain triggers occurred.20 5 One of those triggers is
if the directors had refused to act on one of those precatory proposals
that achieve a majority vote (even though the vote is only a sugges-
tion). 206 The bottom line would be to move into the shareholder
realm additional matters that traditionally have been done by- direc-
tors. The SEC has considered such a use of the proxy rules at several
times in its history, but each time has stopped short of intruding fur-
ther into state law. Its most recent proposals provoked a strong reac-
tion from the business community which seems to have stalled
additional agency action. The question relevant for this Article is how
courts should react to challenges built along the lines of the Business
Roundtable argument that seeks to challenge such a rule. To the
extent that the agency is approaching the outer limits of the authority
202 Solicitation of Proxies, Exchange Act Release No. 4,879, 19 Fed. Reg. 246, 247
(Jan. 14, 1954).
203 See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Relating to Proposals By Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12,598, 9
SEC Docket 1030, 1033 (July 7, 1976) (proposed rule); Exchange Act Release No.
12,999, 10 SEC Docket 1006, 1010 (Nov. 22, 1976) (final rule).
204 Amendment to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
40018, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,119 (May 28, 1998) (assuming that a proposals drafted
as a recommendation or suggestion is proper unless the company demonstrates
otherwise).
205 Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, 68
Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,784 (Oct. 23, 2003).
206 Id.
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given by Congress, federalism likely will become a part of judicial con-
sideration and a barrier to agency action. 2°7
C. A Peek at the Future
How might the history of corporate governance via stock
exchange listing standards interact with the new realities in the mar-
ket of exchanges and in litigation? Three observations seem perti-
nent. First, we are in the twilight of corporate governance via stock
exchange action. The independent director requirements of
2002-2003 will likely be the last important American governance rules
to arise from the exchanges. In the new world of for-profit exchanges
that have arisen in the last few years, there is simply no longer the
economic incentive for exchanges to spend resources on such rules or
even for constituencies around the exchange to use the exchange as a
vehicle for working out these issues. Second, even the existing rules
are vulnerable to legal attack in the current legal environment where
federal appellate courts have been aggressive in limiting SEC rule-
making. There are questions about standing and how to sufficiently
link the federal hand to these rules, but the factual history provides a
good bit of room for a challenge. Third, and a result of the first two,
this may well lead to more explicit and direct federal intervention in
corporate governance, probably with the SEC taking over listing stan-
dards and their enforcement, as has occurred in some other countries
in the wake of the worldwide demutualization of stock exchanges.208
It may be that this link via reform of stock exchanges to keep the
United States competitive will become the legislative vehicle approv-
ing direct federal regulation of corporate governance.
207 The argument may be different than in previous debates over SEC action relat-
ing to shareholder access. In 1961 in his path-breaking treatise on Securities Regula-
tion, Harvard professor Louis Loss first observed that "[i]f Congress had intended to
give the Commission power to reallocate functions between the two corporate organs,
so revolutionary a federal intervention would presumably been more clearly
expressed." 2 Lowis Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 902-03 (2d ed. 1961). But he then
observes that given the broad power in state law allocating power to directors, there
are seldom opportunities for judicial decision barring shareholder action on a partic-
ular matter. "Inevitably the Commission, while purporting to find and apply a gener-
ally nonexistent state law, has been building up a 'common law' of its own as to what
constitutes a 'proper subject' for shareholder action .... [This common law may]
influence the state courts themselves .... Id. at 906.
208 See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 159, at 599.
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CONCLUSION
The seemingly relentless expansion of federal law at the expense
of the states found across our society shows up in corporate law as
well. Yet Congress has not enacted a federal incorporation statute
and the federal courts have been firm in curbing either judicial or
agency action that would overrun established state areas of regulation.
The flurry of reform that followed the Enron and WorldCom scandals
has exposed new strains on federalism in corporate and securities
laws. In addition to the Congressional action in Sarbanes-Oxley, the
stock exchanges, in what I have argued is indirect federal agency
action, have overrun a substantial area of state law. The recently
proposed SEC proposals on shareholder access to the director nomi-
nation process similarly are open to attack as inappropriate agency
movement of the boundary between state and federal regulation. But
as the changing economics of operating a stock exchange take away
traditional economic incentives for governance rule-making from the
exchanges, the next point of discussion for corporate law federalism
may well arise from the movement of listing standards for national
securities markets into the federal government.
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